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 ABSTRACT 
 
Empirical research on buyer-supplier relationships has almost exclusively examined domestic 
(both firms from the same country) exchange.  The growing importance of international 
marketing and global sourcing suggest a need to understand relationships across national 
boundaries -- transnational business relationships. Drawing on theories of governance, the 
authors hypothesize differences in governance between domestic and transnational business 
relationships.  They examine the use of three specific governance mechanisms (market 
governance, trust, and formal contracts) commonly employed in buyer-supplier relationships.  
Hypotheses are tested with data from 511 purchasing professionals in the United States and 
Germany (201 reporting on transnational relationships).  Results indicate that market 
governance and trust are used less in transnational than in domestic relationships.  No 
differences are found in the use of contracts.  Implications for theory and practice are 
discussed. 
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 As firms expand their global sourcing and international marketing efforts, buyer-
supplier relationships across borders -- transnational business relationships -- are becoming 
increasingly important.  Although there is a rich body of literature on buyer-supplier 
relationships (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Gummesson 1987; Heide and John 1990, 1992), 
little empirical research has explicitly examined those relationships in an international 
context (Johnston and Spekman 1995).  In a meta-analysis of the advances in international 
marketing, Douglas and Craig (1992, p. 297) comment on the status quo of current research 
on transnational buyer-supplier relationships:  
While management of buyer-seller relationships has become an increasingly 
important issue in many domestic markets, the complexity of buyer-seller 
relationships in an international context has been sadly neglected. 
 Cross-cultural research has provided many relevant insights, but it highlights cultural 
differences of business relationships by focusing on domestic relationships in different 
countries (e.g., Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Kale 1986; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 
1995a), rather than analyzing specific aspects of transnational relationships. 
 Only very few studies contribute to the emerging field of transnational business 
relationships between buyers and suppliers. Moreover, most of them are anecdotal (e. g., 
Reardon and Spekman 1994). Exceptions are studies by LaBahn and Harich (1995), Spencer, 
Wilkinson, and Young (1996), and the IMP Group (e. g., Hallén, Johanson, and Seyed-
Mohamed 1987; Johanson and Hallén 1989). The work of the IMP Group is especially 
valuable because the researchers use domestic control groups to validate their insights on the 
differences and peculiarities of transnational buyer-supplier relationships.  
 The few studies analyzing business relationships in an international context reveal 
important effects of transnationality. They show that the level of adaptations is lower (Hallén, 
Johanson, and Seyed-Mohamed 1987, 1991; Johanson and Hallén 1989), the frequency and 
intensity of contacts are lower (Hallén, Johanson, and Seyed-Mohamed 1987; Johanson and 
 2
Wootz 1986), and the social distance between the exchange partners is greater in 
transnational than in domestic buyer-supplier relationships (Johanson and Wootz 1986). 
 To the best of our knowledge, the governance of buyer-supplier relationships has not 
been studied in the international context.  Governance is a fundamental aspect of exchange 
relationships. It consists of the way exchange is coordinated and regulated and the processes 
and mechanisms used to organize and manage business relationships (Heide 1994; Mohr, 
Page, and Gundlach 1995).  Three governance mechanisms receiving increased attention 
from both scholars and practitioners are market governance, trust, and formal contracts 
(Bradach and Eccles 1989; Mohr, Page, and Gundlach 1995; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Zenz 
1994).  Buying firms frequently rely on market governance by monitoring the products and 
prices of alternative sources of supply (Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990).  Trust develops 
if the partner is perceived as being honest and concerned for the customer and is an important 
governance mechanism of close, long-term relationships (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Ganesan 
1994).  Finally, business partners commonly draw up formal contracts that outline the 
obligations and responsibilities of each party in the relationship (Macaulay 1963; 
Stinchcombe 1985).   
 The purpose of this paper is to analyze the extent to which different governance 
mechanisms are used in transnational and domestic business relationships.  Research of this 
type can contribute significantly to the emerging field of relationship marketing because it 
extends the scope of studies on buyer-supplier relationships to an international context. 
Although primarily descriptive rather than prescriptive in nature, our study is relevant to 
managers involved in international marketing or procurement because understanding 
transnational business relationships is crucial for the success of managers. 
 In the following section, we provide theoretical background for studying governance 
in transnational relationships.  A key argument in the theoretical reasoning is that uncertainty 
plays an important role in the governance in transnational relationships.  Subsequently, we 
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propose hypotheses related to the three governance modes.  We then describe an empirical 
study carried out in the United States and Germany, and report the results of the data 
analysis.  Finally, we discuss implications and limitations of the study. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 We selectively review theories of governance and discuss the role of uncertainty in 
business relationships. The two frameworks that provide guidance in the examination of 
governance in transnational buyer-supplier relationships are transaction cost theory and 
relational contracting theory.  Then, we consider the unique nature of uncertainty in the 
context of transnational buyer-supplier relationships. 
Theoretical Perspectives on Governance 
 Governance mechanisms or governance modes are “... those approaches employed by 
participants to structure and regulate their conduct in exchange” (Mohr, Page, and Gundlach 
1995, p. 4).  Governance is particularly important for managing complex exchanges 
characterized by a long time horizon and close cooperation (Bradach and Eccles 1989; 
Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Heide and John 1992). 
 Transaction cost theory distinguishes governance by markets and hierarchies 
(Williamson 1979).  One of the  key drivers of the way exchanges are governed is the 
uncertainty surrounding an exchange situation (Williamson 1981, 1991).  According to 
transaction cost theory, hierarchy is superior to market coordination under conditions of high 
uncertainty because market governance creates relatively higher transaction costs in such 
situations.  A hierarchical mechanism commonly used in buyer-supplier relationships is the 
contract (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; Stinchcombe1985).  Transactions characterized 
by low levels of uncertainty are governed most efficiently by markets.  Hence, efficient 
governance requires the use of a mechanism suited to the level of uncertainty.  
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 Although transaction cost theory provides valuable insights about governance, it does 
not consider social elements of business relationships.  Several authors therefore have 
expanded the transaction cost framework with relational contracting theory and the idea of 
trust as a governance mechanism (e.g., Bradach and Eccles 1989; Heide and John 1992; 
Smith and Aldrich 1991).  Relational contracting theory explicitly considers social elements -
- norms -- as mechanisms governing long-term exchange (Macneil 1978, 1980).  Relational 
norms regulate the behavior of the parties involved in commercial exchange and enhance the 
development of close and trusting business relationships (Kaufmann and Dant 1992; 
Kaufmann and Stern 1988, 1992).  Trust is an important aspect of midrange forms of 
coordination such as business relationships: “... it should be clear that the social context as 
manifested in trust serves as a powerful control mechanism, just as price and authority do” 
(Bradach and Eccles 1989, p. 110).  
 Overall, the theoretical perspectives emphasize the role of costs and uncertainty in 
governance and the importance of three governance mechanisms:  market governance, trust, 
and contracts.  We next consider the specific problems that tend to raise uncertainty in 
transnational  business relationships. 
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Uncertainty in Transnational Buyer-Supplier Relationships  
 In comparing international business with domestic economic activities, many authors 
have emphasized the manifold problems and risks that increase the uncertainty firms must 
face in the international arena (e. g., Cateora 1987; Klein, Frazier, and Roth 1990). As 
Mascarenhas (1982, p. 87) states: “If the domestic business environment can be labeled 
uncertain, the international business environment is doubly so.”  Some sources of uncertainty 
affect both domestic and transnational business relationships (referred to as general sources 
of uncertainty), but the fact that several problems and risks are specific to transnational 
buyer-supplier relationships suggests that uncertainty is greater in such relationships.  
 One general source of uncertainty is the dynamism of the market.  In the international 
context, a greater number of potential suppliers leads to intensified competition, which in 
turn leads to a higher frequency and magnitude of changes in the products, services, and 
technology available.  For example, prices and costs change more often and more 
significantly in the international than in the domestic marketplace. Technologies and product 
quality change more rapidly because suppliers have to react immediately to competitive 
moves if they want to survive global competition.  Additionally, the complexity of 
international business relationships is greater. The supply market consists of a highly 
diversified spectrum of suppliers that are very heterogeneous in capabilities. 
 For business relationships across borders one of the specific problems and risks 
(international risk in the terminology of Vernon 1983) is culture.  Since Hofstede's (1980) 
seminal work on “culture's consequences,” problems in cross-cultural interaction have been 
studied extensively (e. g., Adler and Graham 1989; Anderson and Weitz 1989; Aviel 1990; 
Boyacigiller 1991; Ford 1984; Graham 1985; Hawrysh and Zaichkowsky 1989; Horng 1993; 
Kale and McIntyre 1991; Shane 1992; Törnroos and Möller 1993).  Together, that body of 
research provides considerable evidence on the effects of culture on many facets of 
interaction. 
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 Communication problems are another major concern in transnational buyer-supplier 
relationships.  Apart from different languages, persons conducting transnational business 
must cope with unfamiliar verbal (Adler 1986) and nonverbal communication behavior 
(Bandyopadhyay and Robicheaux 1993).  Further, fewer channels for formal and informal 
communication are present between countries than within countries (Håkansson and 
Johanson 1988). 
 Other problems specific to the transnational context are political risks (protectionism, 
expropriation) and economic risks, such as exchange rate fluctuations (Mascarenhas 1982).  
Such risks affect several marketing parameters, as shown by Rice (1984).  Exchange rate 
fluctuations are particularly harmful for firms with a high volume of international trade 
activities.  In addition, firms must cope with problems due to technological, social, time, and 
geographic distance (Ford 1984).  Those aspects have been largely ignored in the literature, 
but are important in consideration of the specific problems that create uncertainty in the 
transnational context. 
 In summary, uncertainty apparently is higher in transnational than in domestic 
business relationships for two reasons.  First, the general sources create a higher level of 
uncertainty in transnational relationships.  Second, certain problems and risks are specific to 
the international context and need not be considered in domestic relationships.  Implications 
for the use of the different governance mechanisms in the two contexts are discussed in 
greater detail in the next section. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 Drawing on theories examining governance in commercial exchange, uncertainty, and 
international business, we develop a set of hypotheses for each of the three governance 
mechanisms.  We describe each mechanism, examine specific aspects of its use in the 
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international context, and state a hypothesis about its relative use in transnational and 
domestic relationships.  
Market Governance 
 In the industrial buyer-seller context of our research, market governance is reflected 
in the buyer’s active monitoring of the supply market.  Active market monitoring involves 
tracking the products and prices of alternative suppliers, relying on bidding processes for 
supplier selection, and using of multiple sources of supply.  Market governance is an 
economic, market-related mechanism that plays an important role in many buyer-supplier 
relationships (e.g., John 1984; Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990; Ouchi 1979).  
Interestingly, although market governance provides a foundation for transaction costs 
analysis, very little research has attempted to operationalize and explore it. 
 A buying firm faces several difficulties implementing market governance in the 
international context.  First, international markets are less transparent than domestic markets 
and experience with foreign suppliers tends to be limited.  Because generally less information 
is available about foreign suppliers and the sources of information are not well-known, active 
monitoring of alternative suppliers will be hampered by an information problem (Bello and 
Lohtia 1995).  Further, the products and services of a foreign supplier may not be entirely 
comparable to those of domestic suppliers.  In some cases only some features may differ, but 
in other cases a particular product may only be available from foreign suppliers.  Finally, 
establishing an international source of supply requires the buyer to invest time and effort, 
which raise the switching costs and the ability to trigger the penalties inherent in the market 
mechanism. 
 Acquiring information about a foreign supplier and employing personnel acquainted 
with the other country both tend to be very costly.  Hence, costs of market governance are 
higher in transnational than in domestic buyer-supplier relationships.  We therefore would 
expect market governance to be employed to a lesser extent in a transnational context.  That 
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expectation is supported by the basic tenet of transaction cost theory which suggests market 
failure under conditions of high uncertainty are present transnational business relationships.  
Together, those arguments support the following hypothesis: 
H1: The use of market governance is less common in transnational than in 
 domestic buyer-supplier relationships. 
Trust 
 We define trust as the buyer’s perceptions of the credibility and benevolence of the 
supplier firm  (Doney and Cannon 1997; Ganesan 1994; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 
1995a). In accordance with research on interpersonal relationships (e. g., Blau 1964; Deutsch 
1958; Larzelere and Huston 1980; Rotter 1967), trust has been emphasized as a vital concept 
in business relationships (Anderson and Narus 1986; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Mohr and 
Nevin 1990).  Trust is an important social aspect of business relationships and is associated 
with less need for control activities (Smith and Aldrich 1991).  Trust reflects an aspect of 
social control (Williamson and Ouchi 1981) inherent in clan-type institutions. 
 Although we predict that uncertainty in transnational business relationships leads to 
market failure, we expect the high costs of developing trust to limit the level of trust in 
transnational exchange.  Particularly because of the cultural distance (Ford 1984) between 
buyers and suppliers with different cultural backgrounds, they need time to become 
acquainted with the differences and peculiarities that influence exchange behavior (Horng 
1993).  The parties are not familiar with each other’s business customs and practices.  
Moreover, the low frequency of contact due to geographic distance (Johanson and Wootz 
1986) has a negative effect on building trust (Doney and Cannon 1997).  In domestic 
business relationships, meetings can be arranged easily and informal bonds can be built.  
Literature also suggests communication problems in transnational buyer-supplier 
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relationships because of differences in both language and nonverbal communication 
(Bandyopadhyay and Robicheaux 1993).   
 Because of the importance of communication for building trust (e.g., Anderson and 
Narus 1990; Morgan and Hunt 1994), uncertainty in communication with a foreign exchange 
partner may lead to a low level of trust in transnational relationships.  
H2: The customer’s trust in a supplier is lower in transnational than in domestic 
 buyer-supplier relationships. 
 Formal Contracts 
 Formal contracts enable the exchange partners to set up and rely on formal 
agreements that outline their obligations and responsibilities (e.g., Gundlach and Achrol 
1993; Stinchcombe 1985, 1990).  Contracts are a classical mechanism for regulating 
exchange and “... may be used or may exist in greater or lesser degree, so that transactions 
can be described relatively as involving a more contractual or a less contractual manner of 
creating an exchange relationship ...” (Macaulay 1963, p. 56).  Relational contracting theory 
argues that contracts prevail in discrete, short-term exchanges: “... for many modern 
exchanges involving longer terms and extended interaction, such as those found across many 
buyer-seller relationships..., such a discrete perspective is limited in its ability to provide 
guidance and regulate conduct of parties involved” (Gundlach and Achrol 1993, p. 141).   
 However, contracts provide a good basis for the settlement of disagreements that are 
anticipated to arise in the future.  In contracts, uncertainty about the performance of a 
supplier can be reduced and unclear aspects made explicit.  The written fixation and detailed 
description of obligations as well as penalties for nonperformance may help both parties 
overcome reservations.  Our theoretical reasoning is supported by Håkansson and Johanson 
(1988, p. 377) who state that “... the tendency to use formal cooperation is stronger in 
international business as there are fewer developed channels for informal market 
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communication between countries than in countries.” Formalizing agreements with contracts 
helps to minimize misunderstandings that may arise with cross-cultural verbal 
communications. 
 The costs of setting up contracts are as low as the costs incurred to build trust or 
permanently monitor the market.  Accordingly, Hawrysh and Zaichkowsky (1989, p. 32-33) 
claim that “... contractual language requiring specific performance and penalties in case of 
default is increasingly common in Japanese/American business agreements.” 
 Formal contracts are also discussed as a substitute for integrating exchange as they 
establish a quasi-authority between exchange partners (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; 
Stinchcombe 1985; in relation to international relationships, see Haugland 1996).  Contracts 
provide a governance mechanism that might act as hierarchy (Stinchcombe 1985).  Hence, 
transaction cost theory would suggest greater use of contracts when the buying firm has little 
experience with the foreign supplier and uncertainty is high.  
 Overall, our arguments suggest a positive effect of transnationality on use of formal 
contracts.  
H3: The degree of reliance on formal contracts is higher in transnational than in 
 domestic business relationships. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Data Collection and Sample 
 Data were collected in the United States and Germany by means of a questionnaire 
mailed to manufacturing firms in the chemical, mechanical, and electrical industries (U.S. 
SIC codes 28, 30, 32-38).  Those industries were chosen because preliminary investigations 
indicated that they typically do a large share of business abroad. In the United States, the 
sample frame was drawn from members of the National Association of Purchasing 
Management (NAPM).  The sample of German firms was provided by the German 
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counterpart to NAPM, the BME (Bundesverband für Materialwirtschaft, Einkauf und 
Logistik) and the German Chamber of Commerce. 
 We focused on relationships in which the buying and selling organizations were both 
manufacturers and sales were made through direct channels of distribution. Consistent with 
the objectives of our study, the sampling design included both domestic and transnational 
supplier relationships.  Transnational supplier relationships involve purchases from a supplier 
headquartered in another country.  Therefore, the buying organizations were requested to 
report on either a domestic supplier or a transnational supplier in either Germany (for 
American buying firms) or the United States (for German buying organizations). 
 Pretests indicated that less than 20% of the firms conducted business with a supplier 
in the other country.  Therefore, most of the data collection involved telephone 
prenotification, whereby potential respondents were screened and asked to participate in the 
study.  Those indicating they had suppliers in the other country were asked to report on the 
transnational supplier with which they had most recently had contact.  Buying firms that did 
not purchase internationally from the other country were asked to report on the domestic 
supplier with which they had most recently had contact.  In the United States, qualified firms 
that agreed to participate were faxed a personalized letter and questionnaire; in Germany 
questionnaires were mailed.  Firms not responding after three weeks were faxed or mailed a 
followup letter and another questionnaire. 
 In the United States, of the 566 firms contacted initially 370 were determined to be 
qualified, although 55 indicated they were either unwilling or unable to complete the 
questionnaire.  Hence, 315 firms were faxed questionnaires, and responses were received 
from 227 or 61% of the able and qualified firms. 
 In Germany, 663 firms were mailed questionnaires without prenotification.  To 
increase the number of transnational relationships, a second mailing list provided the names 
of German firms doing business with American suppliers.  From that list, 521 firms were 
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telephoned and 416 agreed to complete the questionnaire.  We obtained 302 responses from 
the 1079 questionnaires mailed out, for an overall response rate of 28% in Germany 
 Altogether, 529 completed questionnaires were returned, with 227 American and 302 
German manufacturing firms reporting on a supplier relationship.  Twelve respondents 
reported a low level of confidence in their responses and were excluded from further analysis.  
An additional six responses were dropped because of excessive missing data.  Our final 
usable sample consisted of reports on 511 buyer-supplier relationships. 
 Data collected respresented four categories of business relationships (see Figure 1): 
two types of domestic business relationships (American customers with American suppliers, 
German customers with German suppliers) and two types of transnational business 
relationships (American customers with German suppliers, German customers with American 
suppliers). 
 
Figure 1 
American and German Subsamples 
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 Respondent competency was indicated in three ways.  First, 78% of the respondents 
were either purchasing managers/directors or general managers/owners, whose titles 
indicated a high level of knowledge on the subject of the study.  Second, two items at the end 
of the questionnaire assessed the respondents' confidence in their ability to respond to the 
questionnaire items and their level of involvement with the supplier.  The mean ratings were 
uniformly high, 4.37 (confidence) and 4.32 (involvement) on a 5-point scale. Finally, almost 
90% of the respondents had been involved in purchasing for more than five years.  Together, 
the procedures and results suggested that the respondents were sufficiently qualified to act as 
key informants on their organization and its relationship with a supplier. 
 Nonresponse bias was tested in two ways.  First, early and late responders were 
compared on several descriptive variables (e.g., experience in purchasing, number of 
employees at the respondent firm).  Most of the late responders returned the questionnaire 
only after reminders.  No differences were found between the two groups.  Second, we 
compared the respondents with 85 nonrespondents (50 in Germany and 35 in the United 
States) who were contacted by telephone and agreed to answer four questions about 
themselves and their company (job title, purchasing experience, global sourcing experience, 
and number of employees in buying firm). We found no differences between the groups.  
Together the findings provide some evidence that nonresponse bias was not a problem with 
our data.  
Measure Development and Assessment 
 Multi-item scales were generated on the basis of interviews with global sourcing 
experts and a review of the literature.  The questionnaire was designed in English.  To 
enhance translation equivalence (Douglas and Craig 1983), the questionnaire was translated 
into German by one person and backtranslated into English by a second person (each of 
whom were bilingual in English and German).  The original English version and the 
translated/backtranslated English versions were checked for conceptual equivalence, and 
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changes were made to the translated version where necessary.  The resulting versions were 
then pretested and modified based on comments from purchasing managers in the United 
States and Germany. We either modified or directly adopted previously tested measures. In 
general, 5-point Likert scales with “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree” as anchors were 
employed.  
 We checked the psychometric quality of the measures by using procedures suggested 
in the measurement literature, assessing cross-language metric equivalence, item and scale 
reliability, unidimensionality, and convergent and discriminant validity (Anderson and 
Gerbing 1988; Bagozzi and Phillips 1982; Baumgartner and Homburg 1996; Douglas and 
Craig 1983; Fornell and Larcker 1981; Gerbing and Anderson 1988; Mullen 1995).  The 
results of those analyses follow our description of the scales used to measure the theoretical 
variables. 
 Description of Measures.  Market governance was operationalized as the extent to 
which a buying firm relies on the market mechanism to coordinate exchanges.  It was 
assessed with five items asking the respondent to report on the use of bidding, multiple 
sources, and the control of prices and quality of other sources of supply.  The 
operationalization was inspired by Noordewier, John, and Nevin (1990).  Unlike other 
researchers, we used global items instead of items representing different monitoring 
procedures or items representing different aspects of supplier performance (e. g., Heide and 
John 1990). 
 For the operationalization of trust we drew primarily on the scales of Kumar, Scheer, 
and Steenkamp (1995a, b) and Ganesan (1994).  The scale consists of six items measuring 
general trust, aspects of altruism, honesty, and the reliability of the supplier. 
 Finally, formal contracts captures the development of and referral to formalized 
contractual agreements in business relationships.  Drawing on operationalizations by Dwyer 
and Oh (1987) and Cannon and Perreault (1994), we used four items to measure formal 
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contracts.  The items referred to the presence, content, and use of contracts to govern the 
relationship with the supplier.   
 Metric Equivalence.  The first step in the analysis of the measures was structural 
equation modeling and confirmatory factor analysis to determine whether the factor loadings 
differred across the two different language samples.  Equivalent factor loadings across the 
two different language versions of the questionnaire, would allow the samples to be 
combined for subsequent assessment procedures (Mullen 1995). 
 Multiple-group confirmatory factor analyses were run with LISREL 8 (Jöreskog and 
Sörbom 1993).  The first constrained the factor loadings across the English and German 
language samples to be equivalent.  The second allowed the factor loadings to be freed across 
the samples.  A statistical test comparing the differences found no statistically significant 
differences in the factor loadings for the measures of the three governance mechanisms 
(χ2diff(15) = 21.25; p > .05).  The test provided strong evidence of metric equivalence across 
the two languages, and the two samples were combined for subsequent measure analysis. 
 Measure Reliability and Validity.  Table 1 reports the items and summary 
measurement information related to the governance mechanisms.  As suggested by the 
values, the items and scales have reasonable reliability and validity.  Composite reliability of 
at least .6 and average variance extracted above .5 have been suggested by Bagozzi and Yi 
(1988).  Only in the case of formal contracts is the average variance extracted slightly lower 
(.49) than the desirable value.  The high t-values of the factor loadings indicate convergent 
validity (Bagozzi, Yi, and Phillips 1991). The overall fit indices show satisfactory results, 
with an AGFI (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993) negligibly lower than the .9 value considered to 
be acceptable (Bagozzi and Yi 1988).  The RMSEA meets the recommended value of .08 
(Browne and Cudeck 1993). In summary, the statistics show satisfactory results. 
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Table 1 
Measuresa and Key Summary Statistics for Theoretical Constructs 
 
Scale Name and Individual Items 
Composite 
Reliability 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted
Market Governance .86 .55 
We usually get more than one bid when we purchase this product. 
This supplier is our sole source for this product. (R) 
We do not even consider other suppliers for purchases of this product. 
(R) 
We try to use multiple sources for this particular supply. 
We often check the price and quality of other vendors of this product. 
  
Trust .87 .54 
This supplier is trustworthy. 
This supplier is genuinely concerned that our business succeeds. 
We trust this vendor keeps our best interests in mind. 
This supplier is not always honest with us. (R) 
We can not count on this supplier to keep its promises. (R) 
We completely trust this supplier. 
  
Formal Contracts .79 .49 
We have formal agreements that detail the obligations of both parties. 
We have contractual agreements that include specific penalties for 
non-performance. 
Our relationship with this supplier is governed by written contracts. 
We often refer to contracts to settle differences of opinion. 
  
Fit statistics: GFI = .91; AGFI = .87; CFI = .91; RMSEA = .08 
a All scales are 5-point scales, with “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree” as the anchors. 
(R) indicates reverse-coded items. 
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 We tested discriminant validity by performing, one-at-a-time, chi-square difference 
tests between a model in which a factor correlation was fixed at 1.0 and the original 
(unrestricted) model. As every restricted model had significantly poorer fit than the 
unrestricted model, we concluded that the degree of discrimination between the two factors 
was sufficient.  Discriminant validity was also supported by the criterion suggested by 
Fornell and Larcker (1981), which is based on a comparison of the squared pairwise 
correlations between factors with the average variance extracted for each of the factors. 
 To control for factors other than transnationality that might influence the governance 
of buyer-supplier relationships, we included sources of general uncertainty.  The measures 
used to control for general sources of uncertainty were dynamism of product availability, 
dynamism of prices and cost, and product complexity.  Besides uncertainty, availability of 
alternatives and product importance were included as control variables. Dynamism and 
availability of alternatives were measured with multi-item 5-point Likert scales; product 
complexity and product importance were measured with multi-item semantic differential 
scales.  Home country of the buying firm, age of the supplier relationship, and customer firm 
size were included as additional controls. Although space limitations preclude reporting the 
full analysis, the measures of those constructs were evaluated by the same criteria described 
for the theoretical measures and exhibited good psychometric properties. 
 Transnationality and home country of the supplier were measured with binary 
variables.  The dummy variables for transnationality took a value of one for a transnational 
relationship and a value of zero for a domestic relationship.  The country dummy took a value 
of one for American and a value of zero for German respondents. 
Data Analysis Procedure 
 To test the hypotheses, we used a multiple regression with two dummy variables 
(Hardy 1993), transnationality and home country of the buying firm.  All of the independent 
variables were entered simultaneously as predictors of the use of market governance, the 
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level of trust, and the degree of use of formal contracts in buyer-supplier relationships.  Note 
that the regression coefficient of a dummy variable measures the difference in the predicted 
values of the dependent variable between the variable's two categories (Berry and Feldman 
1985; Hardy 1993; Jain 1994) after accounting for the control variables. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Hypothesis Tests 
 Table 2 reports the results of the multiple regression analysis testing the hypotheses.  
Two of three effects of transnationality are highly significant (p < .01).  Drawing on 
transaction cost theory and the international marketing and sourcing literature, we 
hypothesized the level of market governance of buyer-supplier relationships to be lower in 
transnational than in domestic relationships because information about foreign suppliers is 
difficult to obtain, products may not be comparable, and costs associated with market 
governance are higher in transnational than in domestic buyer-supplier relationships.  As 
predicted in H1, transnational business relationships were governed by the market to a lesser 
extent (ß = -.16, p < .01) than domestic ones. 
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Table 2 
Results of Multiple Regression Analysisa 
 Dependent Variables a 
Independent Variables Market 
Governance 
Trust Formal Contracts
Transnationality  -.16***  -.19***   .04 
Dynamism of Product Availability   -.06  -.14***  -.08 
Dynamism of Prices and Cost   .23***   .02   .09* 
Product Complexity  -.07  -.05   .22*** 
Buyer Firm Home Country  -.18***   .02  -.12*** 
Age of Supplier Relationship b  -.03   .06  -.07 
Customer Firm Size (# of          .08*  .00   .16*** 
Availability of Alternatives   .37***   .14***   .05 
Product Importance  .01   .13***   .01 
F-Value/p  11.76***  6.51***  6.39*** 
R-Square   .27   .17   .16 
a   Standardized Regression Coefficients/significance 
b  Variable log-transformed to attenuate skewness 
 
*   p < .10 
**  p < .05 
***  p < .01 
 
 Trust was posited to be lower in transnational than in domestic relationships.  
Developing trust in business relationships across borders involves higher costs because the 
activities involved are assumed to be more difficult and time consuming, and maintaining a 
good relationship requires more traveling.  As hypothesized in H2, the level of trust was 
lower in transnational buyer-supplier relationships (ß = -.19, p < .01). 
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 Contrary to H3, transnationality did not lead to greater use of hierarchy in the form of 
contracts between buyer and supplier in transnational relationships (ß = .04, p > .05).  
Perhaps certain factors reduce the usefulness of formal contracts in an international context.  
For example, the enforceability of contracts in an international environment may be limited. 
Our results suggest that the reliance on contracts is rather a function of the complexity of the 
product purchased, customer firm size, and buyer's home country.  The higher the complexity 
of a product, the greater was the reliance on contracts (ß = .22, p < .01). Additionally, 
reliance on formal contracts was stronger in large customer firms (ß = .16, p < .01), but less 
pronounced in American buying firms (ß = -.12, p < .01). 
 Although we found several significant effects on governance mechanisms, the r-
square values of the regression models are relatively low.  The reason may be the lack of 
certain firm-specific variables in the models.  For example, written purchasing policies 
(which are very common -- especially in German firms) would have strong effects on the 
governance mechanisms used in supplier relationships. Such firm-specific factors represent a 
different domain of variables and are outside the scope of our study.  A major part of the 
questionnaire would have been needed to capture their content because of their complexity 
and heterogeneity.  Against this background, the explanatory power of the regression models 
is considered satisfactory.   
Theoretical Discussion 
 We address several aspects of transnational buyer-supplier relationships that have 
been neglected in prior studies. First, we argue that transnationality creates specific problems 
and risks aside from general sources of uncertainty.  That differentiation is shown to be 
relevant as, apart from dynamism and complexity as general sources of uncertainty, 
transnationality has a separate and strong effect on the governance of buyer-supplier 
relationships. 
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 Second, the implementation aspect of governance is emphasized. Transnationality not 
only creates a need for more governance, but also raises the costs of implementing the 
governance mechanisms in business relationships.  This difficulty suggests a need for more 
research into other mechanisms which may be more useful in governing transnational 
exchange. 
 Our empirical study reveals a lower level of governance on an overall basis in 
transnational than in domestic buyer-supplier relationships.  Both market governance and 
trust were employed less intensively in transnational relationships.  However, the fact that we 
did not find a stronger reliance on formal contracts raises the question of whether other 
governance mechanisms besides the ones considered in our study are relevant for 
understanding transnational buyer-supplier relationships (e.g., reputation, commitment; see 
Anderson and Weitz 1989; Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer 1995; Hill 1990; Powell 1990).   
 Moreover, our results indicate that culture is important in studying relationships. 
German firms relied more than American firms on formal contracts and market governance, 
confirming the view that Germany has a more formal culture than the United States.  Because 
contracts and market governance can be formalized to a high degree, which is not true for 
trust, trust was not affected by the cultural differences between these two countries. 
 The results also show that transnational buyer-supplier relationships are different from 
domestic buyer-supplier relationships.  Hence, more international research on buyer-supplier 
relationships is needed.  The effects of both transnationality and culture underscore the need 
for more empirical research in an international context.  Previous empirical studies have been 
based almost exclusively on data related to domestic business relationships.  
Managerial Implications 
 With the increasing importance of global marketing and global sourcing, a closer 
examination of transnational buyer-supplier relationships is imperative.  We were able to 
show that transnational business relationships have different characteristics than domestic 
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buyer-supplier relationships, even though the United States and Germany are relatively 
similar developed countries.  Differences between transnational and domestic relationships 
might be greater for more dissimilar cultures and even more significant in relationships 
between buyers and suppliers in countries with different levels of economic development.   
 Practitioners must be sensitive to the unique characteristics of transnational buyer-
supplier relationships.  Rules and concepts applied in domestic business relationships may be 
misleading in a transnational context.  Specifically, it is important to understand that the 
overall level of governance is lower in transnational relationships.  Managers who are or will 
be responsible for building or managing transnational buyer-supplier relationships need 
appropriate preparation.  Training activities beyond conventional language training should be 
the minimum preparation for interactions with foreign buyers or suppliers (Bush and Ingram 
1996).  Managers in charge of international marketing or global sourcing need a thorough 
understanding of the culture of business partners abroad.   
 Building and maintaining transnational business relationships as well as preparing for 
transnational interactions leads to idiosyncratic investments, which pay off only in the long 
run.  Hence, management of transnational business relationships must be based on a long-
term orientation.  Short-term considerations do not justify the high costs and high efforts of 
the persons involved in international exchange processes.  Building transnational business 
relationships is a strategic decision, and the long-term effectiveness of decisions to buy 
abroad to achieve short-term cost reduction, as have been made recently by many (especially 
German) firms, is questionable.  
Limitations and Future Research 
 We analyzed the buyer-supplier relationships of two highly developed economies, the 
United States and Germany.  As results by Frazier, Gill, and Kale (1989) indicate, business 
relationships in such countries have different features than those in less developed 
economies.  Additionally, the cultures of the United States and Germany are only slightly 
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different (Hofstede 1980; 1983a,b).  Future research therefore should concentrate on less 
developed and culturally more dissimilar countries. 
 Another limitation of our study is that we have analyzed only market governance, 
trust, and formal contracts as governance mechanisms.  Future studies should examine other 
governance mechanisms such as reputation, ownership, dependence, and commitment (Mohr, 
Page, and Gundlach 1995). 
 A third limitation is that we collected data from only one side of the dyad and from 
only one person, the purchasing manager (single-informant approach).  Although Heide 
(1994) observed a significant correlation between the measures obtained from the two sides 
of the dyad, perceptions might nevertheless be different.  Other functional managers might 
have a different perspective on transnational buyer-supplier relationships than purchasing 
managers.  Future studies might analyze the extent to which perceptions of other managers 
confirm our results. 
 Finally, the time aspect of business relationships could be investigated in more detail 
(Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987).  Although we included the age of the relationship in our 
model, longitudinal data may be of greater value. 
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